اثر میانجی محدودیت مالی بر رابطه سنگربندی مدیریت و سررسید بدهی‌ با نقش تعاملی شرکت‌های وابسته به دولت

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 کارشناس ارشد، گروه حسابداری، دانشکده علوم اقتصادی و اجتماعی، دانشگاه بوعلی‌سینا، همدان، ایران.

2 استادیار، گروه حسابداری، دانشکده علوم اقتصادی و اجتماعی، دانشگاه بوعلی‌سینا، همدان، ایران.

3 استادیار، گروه حسابداری، دانشکده علوم اقتصادی و اجتماعی، دانشگاه بوعلی‌سینا، همدان، ایران

چکیده

چکیده
موضوع و هدف مقاله: سنگربندی (جبهه‌گیری) مدیران، منجر به فزونی قدرت و اولویت حفظ وضعیت شغلی آنها نسبت به منافع سهامداران می‌گردد. این شرایط هزینه‌های نمایندگی و ریسک سهامداران را افزایش داده و منجر به کاهش ارزش شرکت می‌گردد. مدیران جبهه‌گیر بر اساس اهداف خود از بدهی‌های با سررسیدهای مختلف بهره می‌برند. حضور دولت در شرکت‌ها می تواند بر رفتار مدیران جبهه‌گیر اثرگذار باشد و آنرا تعدیل نماید. بر این اساس، هدف این پژوهش بررسی تأثیر سنگربندی مدیریت بر سررسید بدهی با تأکید بر نقش میانجی محدودیت مالی در شرکتهای وابسته به دولت در مقایسه با شرکتهای غیروابسته به دولت است.
روش پژوهش: به منظور دستیابی به هدف پژوهش، داده‌های 129 شرکت در یک دوره 8 ساله از سال 1394 تا سال 1401 مورد مطالعه قرار گرفته است. جهت آزمون فرضیه‌های پژوهش از مدل رگرسیون خطی چندگانه و آزمون سوبل استفاده شده است.
یافته‌های پژوهش: نتایج نشان می‌دهد که سنگربندی مدیریت تأثیر مثبت و معناداری بر سررسید بدهی دارد. همچنین محدودیت مالی در رابطه بین سنگربندی مدیریت و سررسید بدهی نقش میانجی جزئی دارد. یافته‌های پژوهش نشان می‌دهد وابستگی شرکت‌ها به دولت، هر دو رابطه سنگربندی مدیریت و محدودیت مالی و رابطه سنگربندی مدیریت و سررسید بدهی‌ها را تضعیف می‌نماید.
نتیجه گیری، اصالت و افزوذه آن به دانش: بر اساس نتایج پژوهش می‌توان بیان نمود که سطوح فعلی سنگربندی مدیریتی در شرکت‌ها، مخصوصاً شرکت‌های غیر وابسته به دولت، مشوق‌ تصمیمات پرخطر تأمین مالی است و می‌تواند منافع مدیران را بیشتر و تعارض بین مالکان و مدیران را تشدید نماید.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

The Mediating Effect of Financial Constraints on The Relationship Between Management Entrenchment and Debt Maturity with The Interactive Role of State-Affiliated Companies

نویسندگان [English]

  • Faramarz Heydari 1
  • Mahdi Kazemiolum 2
  • Mohsen Khatanloo 3
1 M.Sc. Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Bu-Ali Sina University, Hamedan, Iran.
2 Associate Professor, Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Bu-Ali Sina University, Hamedan, Iran
3 Associate Professor, Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Bu-Ali Sina University, Hamedan, Iran
چکیده [English]

ABSTRACT
The entrenchment of managers leads to an increase in power and the priority of maintaining their job status over the interests of shareholders. These conditions increase agency costs and shareholders' risk and decrease the company's value. Entrenched managers use debts with different maturities based on their goals. The presence of the government in the companies can affect the behavior of entrenched managers and adjust it. Based on this, this study aims to investigate the effect of management entrenchment on debt maturity, specifically focusing on the mediating role of financial constraints in government-affiliated companies compared to non-government-affiliated companies. Research method: To achieve the research goals, we studied the data from 129 companies over an 8-year period, from 2014 to 2021. We used a multiple linear regression model and a Sobel test to test the research hypotheses.The findings reveal that management entrenchment has a positive and significant impact on debt maturity. They also indicate that financial constraints partially mediate the relationship between management entrenchment and debt maturity. The research findings show that companies' dependence on the government weakens both the relationship between management entrenchment and financial limitation and the relationship between management entrenchment and debt maturity.This research brings a novel perspective to the field, shedding light on the impact of managerial entrenchment on debt maturity. The findings suggest that the current levels of managerial entrenchment in companies, particularly non-governmental companies, can lead to risky financing decisions and potentially increase managers' interests, thereby intensifying the conflict between owners and managers.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Debt Maturity
  • Financial Constraint
  • Management Entrenchment
  • State-Affiliated Companies
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